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Abstract: 
In this paper, we argue that the two Koreas’ intentions and actions on the cyber front point 
toward the possibility that they have engaged in cyber warfare against each other. From South 
Korea’s standpoint, a key concern has been North Korea’s advanced cyber warfare capabilities 
and alleged involvement of its substantial workforce in the Internet’s dark side activities. These 
issues need to be looked at the backdrop of the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. 
This paper draws principally upon theories and concepts from military strategy and warfare to 
examine the contexts, mechanisms, and processes associated with the cyber warfare in the 
Korean peninsula. We also compare the two Koreas in terms of various forms of asymmetries in 
cyber warfare and cyber attacks. Also highlighted in the paper are South Korea’s recent 
initiatives and actions to enhance cyber-offense and cyber-defense capabilities. 
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Introduction 
Defense specialists have argued that by combining cyber warfare and electronic warfare with 
other asymmetric assets such as hovercraft, chemical, biological, and radiological 
weapons, North Korea is likely to strengthen its warfare capabilities significantly [41]. 
Consistent with this observation, in the past few years, South Korea’s military, government 
agencies, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and consumers have faced a number of high-
profile cyber attacks. Although it is impossible to prove with certainty, based on indirect and 
circumstantial evidence, South Korea has accused North Korea for most of the major cyber 
attacks facing the country. In March 2014, the South Korean Defense Ministry reported that it 
detected a hacking attempt allegedly from North Korea to steal military data, which used a 
journalist’s computer. According to the Ministry, the journalist covered defense issues, whose 
computer was connected to the Defense Ministry’s Internet network [2]. In October 2013, 
quoting the country’s Defense Ministry, Rep. Chung Hee-soo of the ruling Saenuri Party, noted 
that North Korea launched over 6,000 cyber attacks against the South since 2010 [33]. According 
to the South Korean government, North Korea’s cyber attacks cost the country over 860 billion 
won (US$805 million) between 2009 and 2013 [28]. 
North Korea has also reported that it has been victimized by cyber attacks. Its officials said that 
cyber attacks had been launched against the servers of the country’s broadband provider Loxley 
Pacific Co. in March 2013, around the time as the cyber attacks experienced by South Korean 
banks and TV stations (Table 2) [82]. 
South Korea’s hostile and tense relationship with the North has special implications for the 
country’s cyber security. The two countries are still technically at war. While the North has a 
drastically lower level of economic development, the asymmetric nature of cyber attacks means 
that actors with limited financial and technical resources possess capability to compromise high-
value targets [58]. North Korea has reportedly developed advanced cyber warfare capabilities 
and its substantial workforce is allegedly involved in the Internet’s dark side activities with the 
explicit support of the state. In its annual report on the state of North Korea’s military released in 
March 2014, the US Department of Defense observed that North Korea shifted its focus toward 
offensive cyber operations (OCO) and other asymmetric tactics [69]. 
North Korea-originated cyber attacks have unique and idiosyncratic characteristics and important 
strategic and geopolitical dimensions from the perspective of South Korea. For instance, while 
cybercrimes and cyber attacks originated from China and Russia have allegedly victimized the 
USA and other Western countries, the West has clearer understanding of the point of view of 
China and Russia despite occasional tensions and conflicts. China and Russia also maintain 
diplomatic and economic ties with most countries. The general lack of such understanding with 
regard to North Korea has increased the complexity of the issue [18]. Due to the regime’s 
unpredictability and desperation to survive, North Korea has been described by analysts as 
involving high perceived threats to its adversaries [30]. Moreover, unlike China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), which regularly publishes academic journals and policy 
documents, North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) does not publish any documents. 
Assessing the KPA’s advancement in cyber-weapons is thus an extremely difficult exercise [83]. 
South Korea thus faces unique challenges from the standpoint of cyber attacks and cyber 
security. Unsurprisingly, it has employed various strategic responses to cyber-threats. In 2010, 
South Korea reportedly developed and implemented a cyber-strategy to combat the situation. 
The first part of the plan, which was up and running as of early 2014, focused on protecting 
networks from cyber attacks [40]. It also involves an online propaganda campaign, which 
includes posting on North Korean social networking websites [5]. The second phase of the plan 
involves developing cyber-weapons that can be deployed to physically damage North Korean 
nuclear plants and missile facilities. South Korean Defense Ministry has announced its intention 
to develop weapons similar to Stuxnet, which was designed to destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
facilities [5]. 
In this paper, we use various concepts related to symmetric and asymmetric advantages 
[47, 61, 62] to analyze the cyber warfare in the Korean peninsula. The analysis of this paper is 
expected to provide important insights into factors that affect positive and negative asymmetries 
associated with cyber attacks and cyber security from the perspectives of the two Koreas. We 
also examine the unique natures of cyber-threats facing South Korea and discuss the country’s 
response to such threats. 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining the current state of cyber 
warfare in the Korean Peninsula. Next, we provide an assessment of North Korea’s cyber attack 
capability. Then, we compare the two Koreas in terms of various forms of asymmetry from the 
standpoint of cyber-offense and cyber-defense. The section following this looks at South Korea’s 
recent initiatives and actions on the cyber front. It is followed by a section on discussion and 
implications. The final section provides concluding comments. 
The Current State of Cyber Warfare in the Korean Peninsula 
It is important to make clear at the outset that different definitions of cyber warfare exist. Among 
the earliest examples of cyber attacks that are widely believed to be carried out by a nation state 
include those on Georgia in 2008 and on Estonia in 2007. Cyber warfare experts, however, 
debate over whether these qualify as cyber warfare. According to the strictest definition, a cyber 
attack is considered as a cyber war only if it causes “widespread harm, rather than mere 
inconvenience” [79]. Viewing from this perspective, even the 2008 cyber attacks against Georgia 
may not qualify as cyber war, since unlike the military operations, cyber attacks did not cause a 
physical harm. Some observers, on the other hand, argue that a cyber attack qualifies as a “cyber 
war” if it is combined with conventional military operations. According to this view, the attacks 
on Georgia would thus qualify as cyber warfare but those on Estonia would not [79]. Others 
argue that the effects of the 2007 cyber attacks in Estonia “were potentially just as disastrous as a 
conventional attack on this country” [77]. 
Now let us define cyber warfare for the purpose of this paper. Analyzing a number of documents 
related to war ultimatum and motivations of war such as those of the World War I era (e.g., 
statements of British Foreign Minister Edward Grey and German Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann-Hollweg) and the legendary Mongolian warrior and conqueror, Genghis Khan, 
Hirshleifer [35] concluded that wars were fought for material ends as well as for intangible goals 
such as honor, dominance, reputation, and prestige. Based on this, we define cyber warfare as 
actions in the cyberspace carried out or initiated by a state actor against another state (an 
adversary state) for economic gains or with an intention to cause material losses or to destroy the 
glory, honor, prestige, and reputation of the adversary. A number of cyber attacks that are widely 
believed to be carried out or initiated by nation states such as the 2007 cyber attacks against 
Estonia, the 2008 cyber attacks against Georgia, the Stuxnet worm which was designed to 
destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in 2010, and the 2012 cyber attacks against Saudi 
national oil company Aramco would fit this definition of cyber warfare. To put things in context, 
Table 1 presents some examples of actions allegedly carried out by the two Koreas. Following 
Hirshleifer’s [35] definition of war, these activities qualify as cyber warfare. 
Table 1 Some examples of actions allegedly carried out by the two Koreas pointing toward their 
engagement in cyber warfare 
Actions allegedly carried out by North Korea Actions allegedly carried out by South 
Korea 
A number of cyber attacks on South Korean 
banks, insurance companies and other targets 
during 2009–2013, which led to significant 
economic loss (e.g., erasing computer hard 
drives of one of the largest banks, which left 30 
million customers without ATM services for 
many days) (see Table 2). 
The cyber command’s efforts on 
psychological warfare activities against North 
Korea. Its online propaganda strategy involves 
posting to North Korean social networking 
and social media websites. 
A number of cyber attacks launched to destroy 
the honor and glory of South Korea (e.g., 
during the 63rd anniversary of the Korean 
War), which victimized the ruling Party, the 
presidential office website, military personnel, 
the Defense Ministry, and the National 
Assembly, etc. (see Table 2). 
Plan includes further building psychological 
warfare capability (e.g., courses in the Korea 
University’s cyber-defense school, which is 
sponsored by the South Korean army, include 
breaking malicious codes, psychological 
preparation for cyber warfare and other 
techniques). 
North Korea’s state-sponsored hackers’ 
engagement in criminal activities such as the 
creation of malware to engage in financially 
motivated cybercrimes victimizing South 
Korean businesses and consumers (e.g., servers 
of MMOs such as “Lineage” and “Dungeon and 
Fighter”). 
The Defense Ministry’s plan to strengthen 
offensive capabilities and develop a Stuxnet-
like worm to attack North Korea’s nuclear 
facilities. 
North Korean agents post online comments to 
weaken South Korean morale. 
Plan to train 5,000 cyber security experts by 
2017. 
 
From the material ends perspective, Hirshleifer [35] expressed a sense of optimism that nations’ 
chance of engaging in war has diminished due to the rising costs of and low potential benefits 
from war compared to those that can be realized from peaceful trade and commerce. Because of 
the potentially high costs associated with a physical war, in terms of human lives and suffering 
and longer term development, cyber attacks are viewed as a considerably cheaper and more 
attractive option. From the perspective of South Korea, for instance, cyber attacks may be a low 
cost means for destroying North Korea’s nuclear programs. As noted earlier, in February 2014, 
South Korea’s Defense Ministry outlined its aim to strengthen its offensive capabilities and 
develop a cyber-tool, which can attack the North’s nuclear facilities [8]. The tool will be similar 
to the Stuxnet worm, which was programmed to damage Iran’s centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear 
site. The Defense Ministry also announced a plan to create a new Cyber Defense Command by 
May 2014 to carry out these missions. Likewise, as noted earlier, due to the asymmetric nature of 
cyber attacks, actors with limited financial and technical resources such as North Korea possess 
capability to compromise high-value targets [56]. 
A survey of government institutions, banks, businesses, and schools indicated that in 2003, 
26,000 hacking incidents were reported to the South’s Ministry of Information and 
Communication which was 178 times the level in 1996 [36]. Table 2 presents major cyber 
attacks faced by South Korea in recent years. The president of the Korea Internet and Security 
Agency (KISA) described the recent cyber attacks as Advanced Persistent Threat (APTs), in 
which the perpetrators carefully studied the targets for a long period to develop their tactics [43]. 
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) has also accused the North of manipulating the South’s 
online opinion by engaging in activities such as posting blogs and e-mailing journalists [14]. 
Table 2 Major cyber attacks experienced by South Korea in recent years 
Time Explanation 
July 
2009 
• Starting July 4, websites of the South Korean and the US government and South 
Korean financial firms were disrupted by DDOS attacks for many days with millions 
of requests per second, which was the first major attack facing the country [16]. The 
websites of the presidential office, the Defense Ministry, and the National Assembly 
were among the key targets. 
March 4, 
2011 
• A second major cyber attack launched malware, which erased computer hard drives 
of one of the largest banks and left 30 million customers without ATM services for 
many days [16]. 
• Cyberattacks that were believed to be originated from North Korea jammed GPS 
signals during joint U.S.–South Korea military drills. The attacks lasted for 10 days 
[12]. 
April–
May 
2012 
• North Korea allegedly launched a jamming attack against the South, which affected 
GPS navigation of 337 commercial flights, 122 ships, and a number of vehicles [45]. 
March 
20, 2013 
• Three broadcasters KBS, MBC, YTN; three banks Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju; 
and two insurance firms reported cyber attacks to their networks to the National 
Police Agency. 
June 25–
July 1, 
2013 
• A series of cyber attacks paralyzed the country’s 69 government offices, major 
banks (e.g., NongHyup and Shinhan), major telecommunications companies, news 
outlets, broadcasters, and other institutions. In addition, the attacks also victimized 
the presidential office website, which stored massive personal data of 2.5 million 
members of the ruling Saenuri Party, 300,000 military personnel, and 200,000 
registered users [7]. The attacks coincided with the 63rd anniversary of the Korean 
War, which started on June 25, 1950. 
 
South Korea’s unique geographic position bordering North Korea makes it especially vulnerable 
to some types of cyber attacks. For instance, regarding numerous GPS attacks against the South 
allegedly carried out by the North, geography has an important role to play. In the 2012 GPS 
attacks, the jamming signals were identified as coming from Kaesong in North Korea about 
10 km from the border and 50 km from the Incheon International Airport [45]. 
Quoting an NIS official briefing her, a lawmaker, who served the country’s intelligence 
committee, noted that most of the websites victimized by the attacks belonged to conservative 
South Korean organizations that support a hard-line approach to North Korea [67]. A major 
target in the June–July 2013 cyber attacks was South Korea’s Hyundai Merchant Marine 
(HMM). This has been a puzzling mystery for some analysts due to the lack of obvious benefit 
to North Korea from cyber espionage against HMM. Ulsch [80] concluded that a more probable 
explanation of the cyber attacks against HMM would be that North Korea might have been hired 
by China to do so. Other possible explanations could be that North Korea launched the attack 
with a different motivation: to sell the information to China. Still another explanation offered 
was that China may have launched the attack but did in such a way that it looked like one that 
was perpetrated by North Korea[80]. 
The regulatory developments that have occurred in South Korea in response to the North-
originated cyber attacks have far reaching implications. For instance, while Google Maps can 
provide directions for public transport in South Korea, they cannot do so for driving. In order to 
block from falling into North Korean hands, South Korean security restrictions put in place after 
the Korean War prohibit the export of map data. Thus, Google and other foreign companies are 
not allowed to provide driving maps for South Korea [70]. As another example of regulatory 
development, following foreign hackers’ alleged cyber attacks in 2004, South Korea made it 
mandatory for Internet-related firms to report hacking incidents [36]. The country became one of 
the first in the world to introduce such regulations. 
An Assessment of North Korea’s Cyber Attack Capability 
It is important to recognize that, as is the case of any underground economy [65], estimating the 
size of a country’s cybercrime industry or its cyber attack capability is a challenging task. Cyber 
attack-related studies and surveys are replete with methodological shortcomings, conceptual 
confusions, logical challenges, and statistical problems. The reliability and validity of indicators 
used to measure cyber attack-related constructs are of major concern [48]. The newness of the 
phenomenon further compounds the problem. Nonetheless, instead of burying our heads under 
the sand, it would be better to address the issue with whatever clarity, rigor, and systematization 
that can be achieved. 
Regarding the development of the North Korean IT industry, it is worth noting that the country 
launched fiber-optic, computer hardware, and commercial software industries in the late 1990s. 
It has developed its own operating system called Red Star. Software development has been a key 
focus of the North Korean IT industry due primarily to the low entry barriers in this industry. 
Estimates suggest North Korea has 4,200 software developers working for various agencies [14]. 
The Korea Computer Centre (KCC) has achieved some success in developing software products 
such as computer games [11]. 
North Korean rulers also view that a well-developed IT industry can overcome the adverse 
effects of economic sanctions facing the country. According to a South Korean official, in 
February 2013, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reportedly said: “If we have strong 
information technology and brave warriors like the Reconnaissance General Bureau, we will be 
able to break any sanctions and have no problem building a strong and prosperous country” [13]. 
It was reported, however, that North Korea’s efforts to develop electronic warfare capabilities 
dates back as early as the mid-1980s [51]. In 1986, it founded Mirim University in the 
mountainous region of Hyungsan, which is currently known as Automation University. 
According to testimonies by defectors who had graduated from the University, 25 computer 
experts from Kyrgyzstan were invited to establish a cyber warfare program. According to former 
students from the University, more than 100 hackers graduate from the program every year. 
Graduates of the University are skilled in writing computer viruses, penetrating network defenses 
and programming weapon guidance systems, and other areas [60]. Such programs are also 
known to exist in several branches of the KPA. 
The KPA is reported to have a cyber warfare unit in the Reconnaissance General Bureau, also 
known as “Unit 121”. According to Won Sei-hoon, then chief of South Korea’s National 
Intelligence Service (NIS), in 2010, there were 1,000 professional hackers in North Korea’s 
cyber warfare unit [55]. In 2009, then-leader Kim Jong Il was reported to order the cyber 
command unit to expand to 3,000 hackers. Currently, the Unit is estimated to have 3,000–4,000 
personnel engaged in cyber warfare. As a point of comparison, this unit is much larger than 
South Korea’s Cyber Command force, which consisted of around 400 personnel in 2013 [6,28]. 
According to the NIS, North Korea has developed cyber attack capability to take over South 
Korea’s power supply systems. North Korea is also reported to be active on about 400 social 
media sites. One such site is the state-run, Uriminzokkiri, a site for Korean speakers, which is 
allegedly used for psychological warfare [14]. 
According to testimony of a North Korean defector, who taught hacking in the country before 
defection, students with a high level of proficiency in math and science are enrolled into a 6-year 
program of Pyongyang’s elite Keumseong High-Middle Schools. After graduating from 
Keumseong, they are sent to attend top technology institutes and universities such as the Kim Il 
Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Mirim University under the General 
Staff Department or Moranbong College under the Reconnaissance Bureau, and various others in 
Pyongyang or Hamheung [13, 57]). Following an expedited 2-year program at one of the 
universities, the students are sent to China or Russia for 1 year to solidify and polish their 
knowledge of hacking and other skills. They receive significant stipends during overseas 
deployments [86]. After overseas training, they are placed in various cyber warfare units 
[55, 86]. These overseas-trained hackers and their families also receive special housing, food 
subsidies, and other benefits including the opportunity to live in Pyongyang, which is considered 
to be a special privilege [86]. A main reason why the hackers get such a special treatment is that 
they are allowed access to the Internet and thus have knowledge of the outside world’s relative 
prosperity. Moreover, the North Korean regime believes that such a treatment may reduce the 
skilled hackers’ temptation to defect [38]. 
According to a South Korean security official, North Korea also has about 12,000 highly skilled 
civilian hackers [13].1 In a report given in November 2013 to the intelligence committee of the 
National Assembly, South Korea’s NIS noted that there were seven North Korean hacking 
organizations and a network of spies operating in China and Japan [76]. In addition, the South 
Korean police estimates also suggested that there were about 10,000 North Korean hackers who 
operate criminal activities from China. These hackers are graduates of elite institutions such as 
Kim Il Sung University and allegedly report to North Korean government agencies such as the 
Korea Computer Center and Rungrado General Trading Corporation. The South Korean police 
also estimated that each North Korean hacker operating from China sends about US$500 per 
month to the “Office 39” or “Bureau 39”, which is a secretive branch of the North Korean 
regime that provides financial support to the country’s leadership in part through alleged 
engagement in illicit activities [21]. 
The forces described above, and perhaps others have provided pressures to North Korean IT 
industry to internationalize. The stated objective of North Korean software industry’s 
internationalization is to learn from foreign IT trends and to promote the development of the 
domestic IT industry [11]. An estimated 1,000 North Korean hackers are believed to be in 
undercover assignments working for educational software companies, animation companies and 
other firms in China, and economies in Southeast Asia, and Europe [13]. 
According to a South Korean security official, there are a number of instances of North Korean 
hackers’ collaborating with South Korea criminal networks abroad, who take orders from the 
latter to create websites for video and online games and gambling and other related assignments. 
The hackers are provided with servers, laptops, and other resources. In August 2011, the South 
accused that the North’s government rented out its team consisting of 30 highly skilled 
programmers from the state-run Korea Computer Center in Pyongyang and the Korea 
Neungnado General Trading Company to a group of fraudsters operating out of China. A South 
Korean internet café owner allegedly worked with the North Korean team to create a malware 
that exploited South Korean servers of massively multi-player online games (MMOs) such as 
“Lineage” and “Dungeon and Fighter” and played them automatically. According to the South 
Korean police, in less than 2 years, the China-based group of fraudsters made about US$6 
million from the malware created by the North Korean team. The hackers’ share of the money, 
which was reported to be 55 %, was believed to be remitted to the “Office 39” [21, 74]. 
In some cases, the gaming websites allegedly serve as the infrastructure for cyber attacks against 
critical South Korea targets [13]. In June 2013, South Korean police discovered that North 
Korea had used free-to-download video games to infect about 100,000 computers, which were 
used to launch cyber attacks against the Incheon International Airport. The attacks were traced 
back to a South Korean businessman, who had reportedly met with the members of the “Bureau 
39” in China. The businessman, who was arrested, allegedly paid tens of thousands of US dollars 
to buy the game, which was then sold to South Korean online gaming companies [26]. In this 
way, the North Korean game developers have been able to kill two birds with one stone: making 
money and launching cyber attacks against key targets in the South. 
Various Forms of Asymmetry: A Comparison of the two Koreas 
The concepts of symmetric and asymmetric advantages and threats would help us to further 
understand the real and perceived risks associated with cyber warfare. Prior research has noted 
that nations are employing information and communications technologies (ICTs) strategically to 
minimize vulnerabilities associated with negative asymmetry [46]. Before proceeding further, we 
define several terms: symmetric advantage is the advantage that can result from matching the 
opponent in terms of strategic resources [61]. Positive asymmetry entails capitalizing on 
differences to gain an advantage. Negative asymmetry involves “an opponent’s threat to one’s 
vulnerabilities” [61]. Strategic asymmetry involves employing “some sort of differences to gain 
an advantage over an adversary” [61]. It could be real as well as perceived. 
Experts argue that only “desperate antagonists” rely solely on ICT-created or other types of 
asymmetric methods [62]. That is, integrated approaches that appropriately combine symmetric 
and asymmetric methods are more likely to give intended results and defeat adversaries [61]. In 
particular, given the limitations of ICTs, approaches that combine non-ICT and ICT tools are 
likely to be more effective. Cyber war is strongly tied and related to conventional forms of 
warfare [27]. The above facts thus need to be considered in relation to more conventional threats 
to South Korea posed by North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. This is because 
an adversary that possesses capability to combine cyber attacks with traditional methods such as 
kinetic warfare can maximize the potential benefits from cyber war. One way to operate for such 
adversary is to gain some temporary advantages with cyber war and subsequently launch 
traditional military attacks [27]. Thus, just like its nuclear capability [31], cyber warfare 
capability is likely to have a key role in North Korea’s offensive warfare strategy. 
Table 3 compares the two Koreas in terms of various asymmetries identified by prior researchers 
[e.g., 46, 61] in the context of cyber warfare. These are linked with the sources of positive 
asymmetry as well as the adversary’s negative asymmetry. 
Table 3 Various forms of asymmetries in cyber warfare: a comparison of the two Koreas 
Form of 
asymmetry 
Explanation Examples 
Organization An adversary adopts a 
different form of 
organization (e.g., 
different combination 
of networked and 
hierarchical forms) 
• While North Korea’s cyber-warriors are organized 
hierarchically like a state actor, they are also 
organized in a network fashion in foreign countries. 
North Korean hackers reportedly work undercover in 
China, Southeast Asia, and Europe. To some extent, 
this structure resembles like a non-state actor. 
• South Korea has teamed up with the USA. 
Will Willingness to bear 
higher costs and take 
greater risk. 
• In light of the sanctions and 
increasing isolation facing North Korea, cyber attacks 
and cybercrime activities are more attractive options 
compared to “kinetic” actions. 
Morale Using different tactics 
than the enemy to 
boost the morale of 
cyber-warriors. 
• Successful cyber attacks may have bolstered the 
morale of North Korea. 
• North Korean propaganda organs have portrayed the 
South as a “puppet” controlled by USA 
“imperialists”. 
• Manipulating the morale of troops in order to create 
an asymmetric advantage is effective in the North due 
to the ban on the Internet use by the average citizens. 
Patience An adversary’s greater 
patience to remain in a 
conflict for a longer 
period. 
• In general, Asians arguably exhibit greater patience 
than Westerners but it is not clear whether any of the 
two countries has an advantage over the other. 
Method Using operational 
and/or tactical means 
that are different from 
used by or expected by 
the adversary. 
• North Korea has employed methods that are tricky 
and effective to penetrate the networks in the South 
(e.g., infecting computers through online 
games). Perusal of puzzling and unexpected targets 
such as HMM. 
Technological Using cyber-weapons 
and weapon systems 
against an adversary 
that is technologically 
superior and 
innovative. 
• South Korea has more resources to develop cyber-
offense and defensive capabilities 
• Major local antivirus firms have capabilities to 
detect and stop cyber attacks. 
Normative Exploiting the 
differences in ethical 
and legal standards 
between adversaries. 
• The North Korea regime is not required to follow 
strict legal rules and requirements to engage in cyber 
warfare. 
• South Korea: The nationalist Left, internal political 
dissidents, and other North Korean sympathizers may 
oppose attacks against the North [25]. 
Source: Based on [47, 62] 
North Korea 
It is clear that North Korea has very much to gain and very little to lose from engaging in cyber 
warfare activities. Internet penetration in North Korea is difficult to estimate accurately but is 
expected to be extremely low. According to BBC, only a “few dozen families” have full and 
unfiltered Internet access [54]. Other estimates range from “a few hundred people” to “1,000 at 
most” [37]. As of 2012, there was only one cybercafé in the capital, Pyongyang [37]. Moreover, 
the closed nature of North Korea’s Internet system makes it is easy to defend giving it a strategic 
and tactical advantage [76]. 
In order to better explain North Korea’s approach, it is important to understand the Chinese 
military’s viewpoint regarding cyber warfare. Two senior colonels of the Chinese military Qiao 
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, have argued that since 
China’s PLA lacks resources to compete with the USA in conventional weapons, it should focus 
on the “development of new information and cyber war technologies and viruses to neutralize or 
erode an enemy’s political, economic and military information and command and control 
infrastructures”. The authors have urged on the development of a means of challenging the USA 
through asymmetry rather than matching it in terms of all types of resources. The authors also 
observed that the US Army is too focused on “weapons whose immediate goal is to kill and 
destroy” and may not be well equipped in assimilating ICTs in the warfare. The North Korean 
regime may have observed the South in the same manner. 
Low cost and deniability make cyber attack an attractive option for North Korea. In light of the 
sanctions and increasing isolation facing North Korea, it is worth noting that compared to so 
called “kinetic” actions such as dropping bombs and shooting bullets, anonymity of cyber attacks 
make it difficult in attributing such attacks to a specific source. Clark and Landau [15 p. 2] 
highlight how problems associated with attribution may limit the ability of a government to deter 
and retaliate: “Retaliation requires knowing with full certainty who the attackers are”. In South 
Korea’s case, it is argued that politically motivated cyber attacks are not just external since it 
also has internal political dissidents [42]. Some of the malware used in the attacks against the 
South Korean targets was traced to a computer in Seoul. Some of the codes also came from the 
USA and three European countries [54]. North Korea may thus launch cyber attacks and avoid 
sanctions and retaliatory attacks. In this way, the development of cyber warfare capability would 
give North Korea the ability to harm enemies without potential negative consequences [59]. 
Some analysts have noted that while technologically advanced states are more fearful of cyber 
warfare, technologically backward states may face greater challenges and difficulties for this 
new mode of warfare [27]. For North Korea, one way to overcome the challenges associated 
with limited resources and infrastructures has been to operate from China, which has more 
developed Internet infrastructures. North Korea is believed to gain cooperation and support from 
China and is believed to establish hacking points there. Some analysts argue that North Korea is 
launching the attacks against the South under China’s “tacit consent” using its more developed 
Internet infrastructure [76]. For instance, the Unit 121 of the Reconnaissance General Bureau of 
the KPA reportedly operates from China, including a luxury hotel in Shenyang, the capital of 
Liaoning Province [16]. According to Kaspersky Lab, in the June–July 2013 cyber attacks, for 
instance, ten of the IP addresses originated in the Jilin Province Network and the Liaoning 
Province Network. Note that these two provinces are near North Korea. The ISPs that serve the 
region are believed to maintain communication lines into parts of North Korea [80], 
North Korea’s expertise and experience in the dark side of the Internet is also a source of 
positive asymmetry. North Korea has used some “tricky” methods to launch attacks against the 
South (Table 3). 
Finally, as a source of negative asymmetry, the lack of resources deserves mention. North 
Korea’s lack of infrastructures such as a reliable electrical grid may prove a serious hindrance to 
develop cyber warfare capabilities. It also lacks resources to train its cyber warfare force with 
state-of-the-art hacking and cracking technologies and advanced cyber warfare capabilities. 
South Korea 
South Korea undoubtedly demonstrates a higher level of resourcefulness in developing greater 
levels of cyber-offense and defensive capabilities. For instance, according to the United Nations 
(UN), in 2012, South Korea’s per capita Gross National Income (GNI) was US$23,180 
compared to North Korea’s US$583 [81]. In order to understand the significance of this 
difference, it is important to note that an asymmetric threat that is effective at one point of time 
may stop producing results subsequently as the adversary adjusts its strategy and tactics [62]. 
This huge difference thus has the consequence that North Korea would face difficulty in 
matching the South in resource-intensive strategies and tactics. 
South Korea’s major local antivirus firms such as HAURI and AhnLab have capabilities to 
detect and stop cyber attacks. In October 2013, AhnLab detected distributed denial-of-service 
(DDOS) attacks on local companies which infected over 10,000 computers. 
The South Korean Defense Ministry announced that it would work with the USA in the 
development of cyber-offense capabilities [4, 22, 78, 85]. Note that the USA has teamed up with 
South Korea and other Asian allies such as Japan in addressing the threats associated with North 
Korea and China [68]. In recent years, the cooperation has been extended to the cyber domain. 
South Korea and the USA have started holding joint cyber-defense exercises regularly and are 
training professionals to protect from the cyber-threats. In the annual war exercise of August 
2012, military forces of the two countries conducted first basic cyber warfare operations, which 
were viewed as a step to enhance cyber-defenses [44]. 
A big concern is a general lack of cyber security orientation among individuals, businesses, and 
government agencies in South Korea. The country’s businesses and government agencies have 
failed to invest in security systems adequately. This is a serious concern, given the widespread 
use of ICTs in the South. For instance, according to the National Information Society Agency, 
South Korean government’s budget for information protection for 2013 was US$214 million [7]. 
According to a Panda Labs’ Annual report 2012, South Korea had the world’s second highest 
percentage of computers infected with malware (54.2 %) only behind China (54.9 %). A 
simulated cyber attack carried out by the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST) in an agreement with a Korean bank indicated that the bank’s security 
mechanism could be broken in a few weeks [7]. Observers have also noted that the South Korean 
military is unprepared to deal with counterattacks [34]. 
South Korea’s high dependence on digital technologies can be viewed as a weakness that 
adversaries can exploit. One estimate suggested that daily online banking transactions in South 
Korea amounted to US$29.3 billion in 2013 [7]. Likewise, car navigation, air traffic control as 
well as US and South Korean military systems heavily rely on the GPS navigation system [83]. 
South Korea’s information superiority makes its networks extremely lucrative targets and highly 
vulnerable to the threats of asymmetric technologies. 
There are a number of additional constraints and challenges. The nationalist left and other North 
sympathizers in the South may oppose attacks against the North [25]. According to an opinion 
poll reported in the Munhwa Ilbo newspaper in May 2005, 48 % of South Koreans said that they 
would back the North if the USA bombed it [63]. Especially young people, who did not 
experience the Korean War, are found to be more sympathetic to North Koreans [52]. Another 
poll conducted among 15 to 25 year olds in the South, which was published by the Chosun Ilbo 
newspaper in August 2005, reported that about two thirds of respondents would support the 
North in a war with the USA [63]. North Korea’s United Front Department is allegedly engaged 
in cyber psychological warfare. There are reportedly about 200 agents whose job is to post online 
comments to weaken the morale of South Koreans. They allegedly do so through about 140 
websites that have servers in 19 countries. In 2011, these agents were reported to post about 
27,000 items of propaganda materials against South Korea and the number of items posted was 
estimated to exceed 41,000 in 2012 [52]. 
A final consideration with the South is the reputation damage that the South Korean cyber 
warfare command suffered from the alleged engagement in psychological warfare capabilities on 
its own population, which may also lead to a reduced public support for the organization. Critics 
have noted that a major weakness of South Korea is its politicized military [19]. It was accused 
that the South Korean military tried to influence voters during the 2012 presidential elections [5]. 
According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, at least 11 officials at its cyber warfare 
command spread online political messages, which praised President Park Geun-hye and her party 
or attacked the opponents before the 2012 election [75]. 
South Korea’s Recent Initiatives and Actions 
Given the unique threat that the North presents, South Korea has realized the importance of 
developing cyber-offense and cyber-defense capabilities. It is taking measures to develop 
symmetric advantage by matching its adversary (North Korea) in terms of strategic resources and 
is attempting to make adequate institutional, financial, and policy preparations for strengthening 
cyber security. South Korea established a cyber command in January 2010 and a cyber-
protection policy team at the Defense Ministry in March 2011 [73]. 
The cyber command has focused its efforts on psychological warfare activities against the 
North’s propaganda and other cyberspace tactics that it considers as offensive [23]. The South’s 
online propaganda strategy, on the other hand, involves posting to North Korean social 
networking and social media websites. The South Korean Defense Ministry’s plan also includes 
further building its psychological warfare capability [23]. Moreover, South Korea blocks access 
to North Korean websites and broadcasts [9], 
In 2012, the South Korean army teamed up with Korea University to open a cyber-defense 
school, which enrolls 30 students per year. Courses included in the 4-year program include 
breaking malicious codes, psychological preparation for cyber warfare, and other techniques to 
protect against cyber attacks [1]. 
The Defense Ministry also established a Cyber Policy Department in 2013. The NIS announced 
that its Third Department2 would give greater attention to “monitoring of cyberspace and 
telecommunications” [78]. South Korea also announced a plan to have a secretary of cyber 
security. 
Military theorists and analysts have the category of asymmetric strategic means should be such 
that the adversary cannot effectively counter [62]. This is especially important for asymmetries 
that are deliberately created than those that arise by default [47]. South Korean policy makers 
believe that cyber-threat is a serious problem facing the country and worthy of serious efforts 
and strategies to combat it. If there is one thing that North Korea is unable to effectively 
replicate, it is South Korea’s resourcefulness and technological might. In July 2013, South Korea 
announced that it would double its cyber security budget and spend 10 trillion won ($8.76 
billion) by 2017. It also plans to train 5,000 cyber security experts by that time [50]. 
The South Korean military has also established a special alert level system called Information 
operations condition (INFOCON), which measures the cyber security threat level. Similarly, in 
March 2013, South Korea’s Defense Ministry announced that it would increase cyber warfare 
forces and team up with the USA to develop deterrence scenarios [22]. In October 2013, the 
South Korean Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense announced that the two 
countries would enhance cyber security cooperation. They also signed an agreement to establish 
a working-level council for cyber security policy [10]. 
In response to alleged North Korea-originated GPS attacks against its commercial flights and 
maritime navigational units in 2012 and 2013, South Korea is making efforts to enhance its GPS 
system capability and is working to develop more advanced GPS technology. For instance, the 
Ministry of Science and Future Planning announced plans to develop systems that can locate the 
“attack point and impact of jamming attempts” [64]. 
Discussion and Implications 
The two countries are asymmetrically motivated to respond to adversaries in the cyberspace. 
Cyber attacks on South Korea, most of which allegedly are associated with the North, are 
frequently motivated by material and monetary gains. Each country is also attempting to destroy 
the honor of the other through cyber attacks and cyber warfare strategies and tactics. 
Some argue that cyber-conflicts are the most serious security threat facing nations since the 
development of nuclear weapons in the 1940s [17]. An Economist article noted: “After land, sea, 
air and space, warfare has entered the fifth domain: cyberspace” [20]. This perspective has been 
echoed by numerous countries. For instance, the Japanese military has defined cyberspace as “a 
‘territory’ where various activities such as information gathering, attack, and defence occur, on 
the same way as land, sea, air and space” [3]. Prior researchers have noted that drastic changes in 
the environment such as those associated with the current cyber-conflicts may create confusion 
and uncertainty and produce an environment that lacks norms, templates, and models about 
appropriate strategies, structures, and legitimacy [29, 66]. A significant change also creates 
ambiguity in cause effect relationships, making learning difficult and inhibiting organizations’ 
ability to undertake a rational search for solutions [53, 66]. Moreover, it is difficult to learn from 
experience during a period of significant institutional change, because past experience is not an 
appropriate guide for future actions [84]. These conditions fit squarely in the context of cyber 
warfare. While the two Koreas are still technically at war and there have been frequent tensions 
between them, cyber-conflicts are a more recent phenomenon. Under such conditions, 
“superstitious learning” may occur [56], and organizations and nations may engage in 
strategically confused behavior [32]. A related point, as noted earlier, is that South Korea’s cyber 
security performance has been poor. The need for change is thus apparent. Prior researchers have 
suggested that organizations tend to change structures when confronted with ambiguity and poor 
performance [66]. To put things in context, it may very well be the case that each country’s 
operations in the cyber domain have been complicated by the lack of an accurate assessment 
regarding the possible response of the rival. 
The Mongolian warrior and conqueror, Genghis Khan famously said that one of the main goals 
of the war was “to rob them [the enemies] of their wealth, [and] to see their near and dear bathed 
in tears”, which provided him “the greatest pleasure” [72]. To put things in context, the North 
Korea rulers may derive pleasure from the cyber attacks-led sufferings of businesses, consumers, 
and government agencies in South Korea. Moreover, gains from cyber attacks on South Korean 
targets may also strengthen North Korean rulers’ economic position. An analysis of the North 
Korean regimes’ use of cyber attacks as a means of raising money for the ruling elites provides 
ample evidence to confirm the views of the skeptics, from economics and political science fields, 
who have questioned the effectiveness of international economic sanctions in producing desired 
economic and political consequences in the target country [39]. 
The two Koreas’ activities in the cyber domain have important implications for them as well as 
other countries. Regarding South Korea’s planned Stuxnet-like worm, some experts argue that 
the worm may damage things that are not intended targets. For instance, the Stuxnet worm also 
attacked Siemens control systems used in a number of facilities such as electrical generation 
plants, factories, and water treatment works [5]. It is also possible that the code may spread 
internationally and victimize unintended targets. Again, returning to the Stuxnet worm example, 
its unambiguous target was the Iranian nuclear program, it also disrupted the operations of 
industrial control computers in plants in China, India, and Indonesia [24, 49]. Given these 
limitations of a Stuxnet-like worm, some analysts have suggested that a more effective approach 
for the South would be to intensify its “information operations” so that North Koreans have 
access to outside news and information, which can change their perception of the country’s 
socio-political and economic development status [e.g., 71]. 
Concluding Comments 
It is fair to say that the two Koreas’ intentions and actions on the cyber front point toward the 
possibility that these countries have engaged in cyber warfare against each other. Each country 
has been attempting to fight the dominance of the other in the cyberspace. Each is also bolstering 
its ability to defend the cyberspace against the threats posed by the other. 
The North’s cyber warfare capabilities may be more sophisticated and complex than many 
analysts give the country credit for. While it severely lacks the capability to match the South in 
terms of technological resources, it may have surpassed the South in terms of some aspects of 
cyber warfare capability. For one thing, North Korea’s alleged engagement in the Internet’s dark 
side activities is likely to produce high externalities and spillover effects for cyber attacks. The 
North has also displayed strong will and confidence in cyber attacks. 
Some types of positive asymmetries can be deliberately created. Likewise, although negative 
asymmetries created by ICTs cannot be completely eliminated, they can, at least, be lessened. In 
this regard, some of the recent initiatives and actions taken by South Korea seem to be in the 
right direction and would help the country maximize positive asymmetries and minimize 
vulnerabilities of negative asymmetries. South Korea’s case demonstrates that adoption of an 
appropriate combination of institutional, financial, and policy preparations are needed to deal 
with the growing cyber-threat. In light of the concerns raised above, South Korea needs to make 
further efforts to improve cyber security orientation of businesses, consumers, and government 
agencies. 
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Footnotes 
1. According to a defector from the Electronic Warfare Unit of the KPA, over 30,000 people in 
KPA may be engaged in cyber attacks against foreign targets (Yoon, 2011). 
2. The first department focuses on gathering foreign intelligence and anti-communist, anti-terror, 
and anti-espionage efforts remain within the second department’s purview. 
 
